INI'RODUCTION
Although the marketing and production functions in a firm are normally organized separately, the two functions are not independent. The relationship between the two fllll ctions is embodied in the fiTlll 's demand. Marketing policies such as pricing and promotion are designed to generate demand.for the firm's products, whereas production policies, such .. as establishing production rates and maintaining in process and finished goods inyentories, are designed to meet that demand.
The interdependencies between the two :functions become further evident when one analyzes the costs involved in generating and meeting demand. In the first place, revenue can only be realized if the demand generated by marketing policies is met by past, current, or future production. Umnet demand does not result in revenue; it only results in marketing costs. Secondly, for a firm with a fixed capacity, the unit cost of production is generally a U-shaped function of its production rate. Thus, given that a firm sets its marketing policies to generate demand and its production rates to meet that demand, it becomes apparent that the £inn's production rates and hence its unit cost of production are indirectly influenced by its marketing policies.
If marketing and production policies are really interdependent, then a case can obviously be made for simultaneous plannin g. The problem of simultaneous plannin g of marketing-production policies has been the subject matter of several previous papers [4, 6, 12, 15, 23, 24, 25] . In this paper, a -3 -new interdependent model of a marketing..,-production system is proposed. The · proposed model is based upon the Vidale�Wolfe model of advertising I26] and the� model of production plann ing [9, 10] . Using the proposed model as a description of the firm's ideal organization problem, 1 a decentralized procedure for separate planning of the £inn's advertising and production policies is designed. We show that in some situations, ·the separate (decen tralized) approach, which takes into consideration the constraints imposed by the organization structure, renders solutions that are as good as the solutions rendered by the interdependent approach. · In other cases we show that decentralized plann ing can lead to significant suboptimality. Six examples are given to illustrate conditions �n which decentralized plann ing does and does not work well.
.AN INI'ERDEPENDENT IDDEL FOR .MARKETING-PRODUCTION PLANN ING
As stated earlier, the interdependent model of a marketingproduction system proposed in this paper is based upon the Vidale-Wolfe advertising model [ 26] and the HMMS model of production planning [ 9] • The model proposed makes use of the following variable definitions:
Variables S(t) =Sales rate at time (t) ($/day).
I(t) =Level of inventory at time (t) (Units).
P(t) =Rate of production at time (t) (Units/day).
A(t) = Rate of advertising expenditure at time (t) ($/day) • -4 -Relationship Between the Sales Rate S(t) and the Rate of Advertising Expenditure A(t)
The relationship between the sales rate and rate of advertising expenditure is modeled using the Vidale-Wolfe model I26].
where
. S(t) = dS(t) dt = rate of change of S(t) at time t ($/day 2 )' X = sales decay constant, r = sales response constant, M = saturation level of sales rate ($/day).
The Vidaie-Wolfe model was selected to represent the sales-advertising
relationship because:
1.
The model has been empirically validated; see [26] 2.
Compared to the Koyck-type distributed lag model [ 13] , which has been used in previous fonnulations of the interdependent models of marketing-production systems [6, 15] , the Vidale-Wolfe model has the following desirable properties: ·
a)
The satlITation level of the sales rate in the Vidale-Wolfe model is finite.
b) The advertising effectiveness is a decreasing function of the accumulated goodwill (i. e. goodwill to date) rather than jus t the goodwill generated in the current period [2] .
3.
The Vidale-Wolfe model has been used to derive the optimal advertising policies for the marketing subsystem {18, 19, 21 ]. The relationships among the level of inventory I(t), the production rate P(t), and the sales rate S(t) can be described by the following identity, where
. I(t) = dI(t)/dt = rate of change of I(t) at time t (Units/day). C = The tmit selling price, which is assumed to be constant.
Note that the dimensions of I(t) and P(t) are tmits and tmits/day whereas the dimensions of S(t) are ($/day). Thus division of S(t) by tmit selling.price (C) is necessary to ensl.ITe consistent dimensions in the above identity.
Objective Ftmction
To incorporate the interdependencies between the marketing and production costs in the firm, a total cost approach is adopted. The rate of total production cost is assumed to be 19]-2 where
C v = Per tmit cost of raw material, direct labor and other production costs that are proportional to P(t). * 2 C IP(t) -P (t)] =T he rate of costs that are related to the P deviation of the actual rate of produc � ion, P(t), from the desired rate of production, P (t) (e.g. tmdertime-overtime costs). The rate of advertising cost is simply A(t) whereas the_ rate of all other variable selling and administrative costs is asstnn ed to be q S(t), where (4) q is a fraction between 0 and 1. The objective is asstnn ed to be one of maximization of profit during the plaruring period plus the value of the inventory and goodwill at the end of the planning period. Thus the objective ftmction is fonnulated as:
J(A, P) = total revenue -total advertising costs -total production costs -total inventory costs -total all other variable costs -total all other fixed costs + the value cf :he inventory at the end of the planning period + the value of the goodwill at the end of the plann ing period. (5) and adding constraints the overall model is now fonnulated (the time arguments have been suppressed for notational.simplicity) in.a minimization fonnat:
where A m ax = maximum rate of advertising that the finn can effectively m aintain A min = minimum rate of advertising that the fi11ll can effectively maintain (assumed to be 0 in this paper) .
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Note that the above fonnulation do es not include the constraints I(t) > 0 and P(t) � 0 (i.e. constraints reflecting no back-ordering) because it is assumed that the presence of the quadratic penalties in the objective function rules out the possibility of I(t) < 0 or P(t) < 0 . Also, for simplicity� p * and r * are assumed to be constant with respect to time.
The single product model (SP) described in the previous section involves two dependent variables [S(t) and I(t)], and two control variables [P(t) and A(t)]. Furthennore, the optimal control problem 1..l ll derlying the above model is "partially singular11• 3
The solution procedure for the optima.l control problem 1..l ll derlying the single product model (SP) is described in [ 2 ] . The optimal steady state solution to the above problem is characterized by equations (6) to (9).
where 4
* *
The optimal steady state sales rate, S , is the solution of Similarly time plots of S, I, P and A are exhibited in Figure 2 . From the figures, it is obvious that in this case the optimal dynamic solution is highly * * influenced by the optimal steady state solution (S , I ) as described above.
During IDOst of the planning period S is near S and I is near I •
DECENTRALIZED MARKETING-PRODUCTION PLANNING
In the previous two sections, an interdependent model for marketingproduction plann ing.was developed and the solution for an examp1e was illustrated.
That approach assumes that a firm can plan its advertising and production policies simultaneous 1 y. This section is devoted to the discussion of the decentralized approach.
It is asSl.Ililed that the firm's ideal organization problem (i.e. the one the firm would like to solve, if possible) is the one described by the interdependent model described in the previous section� but that the firm's decision process requires that the marketing and production policies be planned separately.
In the context of the interdependent model described in the previous section, the marketing and production subproblems can be assUined to take the following form. 
In problem (PROD), S(t) for t e [O,T] is assumed to.be known; i. e. it
is assumed that problem (l'.1ARK) is solved before problem (PROD). Also, q a in problem (MARK) is defined to be the adjusted profit margin for the marketing departmen1 -13 -(q a ) include� production costs and it is assumed to be constant with respect to time. In order to solve problem (MARK) before problem (PROD), the decision· maker nrust somehow specify the level for q a .
The problem of selecting a proper level for q a is the key to successful implementation of the decentralized approach. We suggest a procedure for selecting the proper level for q in a subsequent sub-section. The next a sub-section however, is devoted to examining the relationship between the optimal policy for the overall system and the suboptimal policies within the marketing and production subsystems. The values of q described in expression (12) ignores the quadratic production a costs in the firm. As a result, the optimal steady state policy described by (10)
-14 -equations (13) and (14) ignores the quadratic production costs for the firm.
Hence (13) and (14) can be viewed as the long run optimum within the marketing subsystem (i.e. optimum when only the marketing subsystem.-is considered).
Also, from the model (PROD) , the long nm production subsystem optimum (i.e. optinrum when only the production subsystem is considered) is seen to be
(1 5 ) (16) As stated before, the long run optimum for the overall (interdependent) system is as described in equations (6) - (9) . Thus, given that equations (6) -(9) describe the optimal steady state solution for the overall system, they can be thought of as delineating a compromise between the marketing subsystem optimum and the production subsystem optimum. Specifically, the op timal steady * state sales rate S [which is the solution of equation (6) ] can be viewed as a compromise solution between the marketing subsystem optimum, M(l -I A / rq v ), * described in equation (13), and the sales value, CP , of the production subsystem optilll um given in equation (1 5 ).
Selecting a Proper Level for q a
The level of q a should, in general, depend upon the type of co-ordination between the marketing and production department. 
One possible approach for selecting a proper level for P is as follows.
*
It can be shown that when P = � ; i.e. when the P is equal to the optimal steady state production rate in the interdependent model, the resulting S s in * equation (10) is equal to S • 'Tilat is, when q is calculated using the expression a
the optimal steady state sales rate from problem (MARK) is equal to the optimal steady state sales rate from the interdependent approach.
'Tilus, given the above observation, the following two-step proceuu.t6
can be used to select a proper level for q : a * 1. Solve for S using equation (6), and * *
2.
Using S, calculate q using equation (18) (18)] . OB represents the total profit from the interdependent approach whereas 5 OB represents the total profit obtained using the decentralized approach ,.
with q a = q a . M(l -/>, /rq) /C represents the marketing subsystem optimlDil when * expressed in llll its of llll its/day and P represents the firm's production system capacity. Finally note that the example presented in the previous section is example 3 in the above table, and s0;c represents initial sales in llll its of llll its/day.
Sl.IlJilila ry of Computation Evidence Presented in Table 1 1.
In all the examples except in example 2, the difference between the solution obtained using the decentralized approach and the solution obtained using the centralized ap proach is small. Furthermore, in all " -* the examples, q = q . · Thus the evidence presented in Table 1 strongly a a supports the procedure reconnn ended in the previous section for selecting a proper level for q • a *
In examples 5 and 6, P = M(l -IA. /rq.,) /C; i. e. the firm's production subsystem optimlDil is equal to its marketing subsystem optiIIIl lI Il . Or, the interdependencies between the two functions are minimal. Thus it is not surprising to see that, in these examples, the difference between the solution rendered by the interdependent approach and the · solution rendered by the best decentralized approach is quite negligible.
3.
In examples 1, 3 and 4, there is a significant difference between the * firm's capacity (asslDiling P is a good surrogate for capacity) and the firm's marketing subsystem optiIIIl lI Il . However, with a proper selection of q a ' the firm's adjusted profit margin, the decentralized approach has yielded a solution that is fairly close to the solution rendered by the interdependent approach.
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·
In example 2, the difference between the finn' s capacity and the finn' s * marketing subsystem optimum is significant. In addition, I and the * difference (I -I 0 ) are fairly large; i.e. the £inn's variable inventory· costs are significant as compared to the £inn's variable production and marketing costs. Thus, in this example, the differences between the solutions rendered by the interdependent approach and the solution rendered by the best decentralized approach is q uite significant.
Organizational Design Implications of the C omputational Evidence Exhibited
in Table 1 The last three observations in the previous sub-section have obvious organization design implications. They are: a) If the marketing and production subsystems in the finn match each other; i.e. if the marketing subsystem optimlilil for the finn is e q ual to the finn's production capacity (assuming the capacity is approximately * P ) , there is no need for any fonnal co-ordination between the firm's advertising and production decisions. That is, the finn can plan its advertising decisions first and then, using the demand specified by its advertising plan, plan its production decisions later.
b)
If the marketing subsystem optimlilil and the finn's existing capacity differ significantly, then there is a critical need for formal co-ordination between the two decision areas. The co-ordination can be of two types:
When the variable inventoIY costs are not as significant as marketing or production costs, the co-ordination can be in the fonn of transfer pricing. The marketing department can adjust its profit margin using the expression
where S is the optimal steady state sales level. Thus, in this case, the finn can use the decentralized or the separate approach of planning to plan its advertising and production policies.
II. When the variable inve�tory costs are as significant as the marketing and production costs, the finn is better off planning its advertising and production policies simultaneously. To achieve this, th e finn should entrust the planning of the two policies to some co-ordinating unit such as its corporate-plann ing department. 
SIM.1ARY AND CON CLUSIONS
An inte rdependent model of a marketing-production system is presented in this paper. The model, itself, offers a procedure for the sirnul taneous planning of advertising and production policies in a finn.
Besides presenting the interdependent model, a procedure for planning advertising and production policies in a decentralized fashion is given. The procedure is based on the assumptions that the £inn's ideal organization problem is the one described by the interdependent model and that the adjusted profit margin for the marketing department is constant with respect to time. the interdependent approach works better; however, in some situations, the decentralized approach, when co-ordinated through transfer prices, can render solutions that are fairly close to the solutions rendered by the interdependent approach. Since in many organizations it is not even feasible to plan marketing and production simultaneously, knowledge of the best ways to coordinate decentralized planning is crucial.
-21 -FOOTNOTES 1 ·The ideal organization problem is (see Sweeney et. al. [22] ) . the problem that the organization would like to solve through its decision process.
2 ·rt can be shown that for the above function, the unit cost of production * is minimum when P(t) = P (t).
3 ·"When the Hamiltonian of a control problem is linear with respect to some control variables, and non-linear with respect to the others, the problem is said to be a partially singular cnntrol problem. In this case, the Hamiltonian is linear with respect to A(t) and non-linear with respect to P(t).
4 ·q v can be considered to be the profit margin as a percent before advertising and before quadratic production and inventory costs.
5 ·To remove the effect of differ-mg. end conditions f i. e . I (T) , S (T) ] from the comparison, the end conditions in the solution using the decentralized approach were constrained. to be equal to the optimal end conditions found in the solution using the centralized approach.
